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Reappraising the Legality of Post-Trial Interviews
Captain Fredric I. Lederer, Criminal Law Division, TJAGS A
Enshrined by custom, the peculiar institution of the post-trial interview is coming under

new attack. 1 Originally designed primarily as
a device to secure clemency information for
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the convening authority subsequent to sen- of the right against self-incrimination and the
tencing by a general court-martial, the prac- right to counsel at the post-trial interview.
tice consists of an interview of the newly
The application of the right against selfsentenced accused by either the staff judge
incrimination
at the post-trial interview is far
advocate or, more usually, a member of the
from
a
simple
matter, and there is a surprisSJA's staff. At the interview information is
ing
lack
of
cases
dealing with the point at
sought regarding the accused's perception of
which
a
convicted
defendant loses his privihis recent trial and sentence, whether the
lege.
However,
what
precedent does exist apaccused was satisfied with his trial defense
pears
to
support
the
proposition that a concounsel, and any information which might be
defendant
retains
his privilege not only
victed
helpful in the preparation of the post trial
through
sentencing
but
until completion of
2
review and its sentencing recommendations.
10 In short, for self-inthe
appellate
process.
Despite its possible beneficial effects, the postcrimination purposes the "trial" continues untrial interview closely approximates a minetil finality attaches. This should be particufield: with some luck the accused may make
larly
true for military proceedings because in
it to the other side alive and well-perhaps
the
most
fundamental sense, the actual trial
even in a slightly better tactical position. But
of
a
court-martial
is not complete until the
with a misstatement the accused may hit a
convening
authority
has taken action on the
mine-reveal some past criminal act or negatrial
court's
"recommendations."
u Further,
tive attitude 3-which may destroy him. 4 It is
Article 31(a)'s language 12 prohibits compulthis very chance for disaster which has
sory self-incrimination without reference to
brought the post trial interview to the attentrial.
The accused at a post-trial interview is
tion of the Court of Military Appeals.
in a position in which anything he says may
supply material that would support not only
The origins of the post-trial interview are the trial court's sentence but also its findingsunclear. At one time it appears to have been which remain to be approved. Thus, it appears
supported, encouraged, and perhaps even re- clear that the accused retains his right
quired by both Air Force and Army policy. 11 against self-incrimination in the military at
At present, however, there does not appear to least 13 until the convening authority has actbe any statutory or regulatory requirement ed. Consequently the application of the Article
for post-trial interviews in the Army. Indeed 31(b) warning requirements must be considsome Army commands are known to have ered. The few cases dealing with the application of Article 31(b) warnings to the post-trial
abandoned them completely. Perhaps as a
result of this lack of a regulatory requirement, interview unanimously hold it inapplicable
the procedure used to conduct post-trial inter- although perhaps desirable. 111 The rationale
views appear to vary by location. While the used by the courts, however, is questionable
Air Force and some Army commands utilize at best, as the courts appear to be saying
privacy act statements, 8 including the state- that an accused who is warned of his right to
ment that the interview is voluntary, most remain silent might choose to exercise it and
commands do not warn the interviewee of his thus frustrate the purpose of the interview. 18
right to have counsel present or of his rights This is akin to saying that the fifth amendunder Article 31 of the UCMJ. 7 At some posts, ment right against self-incrimination should
counsel may attend the interview but custom- be inapplicable to trials because it might
arily choose not to do so, 8 and in at least one interfere with the defendant's right to be
case the refusal of an accused to make a convicted and rehabilitated. Dismissing then
statement at the post-trial interview was in- the few precedents in the area, one must
cluded in the post-trial review.8 As a result, reevaluate Article 31(b)'s application. By its
the key legal issues involved in an appraisal very language, it would appear to apply to a
of the post-trial interview are the application post-trial interview, unless one can presume

)--------------------------------~--~---------------------------------------------
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that the basic right against self-incrimination
under Article 31 has already terminated, a
conclusion rejected above. While the Court of
Military Appeals has in the past held Article
31(b)'s warning requirements inapplicable to
the court-martial trial proceeding, 11 the reasoning involved, suspect in any event in the
light of recent judicial developments, is distinguishable inasmuch as it emphasizes doubts
as to the propriety of either defense counsel
or trial counsel warning a witness of his
rights and thereby frustrating. the presentation of evidence. 18 While the "post-trial"
interview is in fact part of the trial of the
accused, it is a distinct part of trial which
lacks both the problems and protections afforded by the judicial phase which is carefully
guided by a trial judge. While the Article
31(d) exclusionary rule excludes evidence taken in violation of either Article 31 or the
voluntariness doctrine from •'trial by courtmartial," even if the exclusion is inapplicable
to post-trial reviews (a doubtful conclusion)
the remainder of Article 31 renders warnings
mandatory! Just because a criminal act-in
this case a breach of the warning requirements--may not suppress evidence does not
render the act any less illegal. It has also
been argued 18 that recent Supreme Court
liecisions limiting prisoners' rights in the area
of self-incrimination dispose of post-trial interview complaints. However, even if constitutional decision can be equated with interpretation of the military's statutory privilege, that
position ignores the fact that the m,ajor precedents involved deals with convicted prisoners
whose appeals have been concluded and who
are subjected to an "administrative" proceeding. The conclusion one reaches, then, is that
Article 31(b) is fully applicable to the i>ost-trial
interview, and that accused persons must be
advised of their right to remain silent, and that
anything said may be used against them at
trial by court-martial.
Current post-trial interview litigation emphasizes failure to warn the defendant of his
right to counsel. Indeed, in one case, United
States v. Simpson, 21 the Army Court of Military Review, considering itself bound by

United States v. Mc0mber, 22 found ·that the
failure to notify defense counsel of the forthcoming interview to be error.23 In view of the
unique nature of the court-martial proceeding,
as discussed above, McOmber and any civilian
cases dealing with the application of Miranda
v. Arizona to post-trial matters are really
irrelevant. The post-trial interview is taking
place as a part of the court-martial proceeding---the post-trial review. Consequently· the
basic right to counsel under both Article 27 of
the UCMJ 24 and the sixth amendment require
that counsel be present or that the Supreme
Court's standards for appearing pro se 25 be
met. Even if "post-trial" proceedings are not
a basic part of a court-martial, McOmber, by
extending the statutory right to counsel to
pre-trial proceedings,26 would surely extend it
to such a "critical stage" as the post-trial
interview.
The post-trial interviewee would thus appear to be entitled to both the right to silence
and the right to counsel and to be warned of
those rights. 11:tis conclusion could well doom
most post-trial interviews. But, why should
they be continued in any event? Military law
has changed drastically since post-trial interview began. Defense cqunsel must now scrutinize the post-trial review, 27 and defense representation must continue until conclusion of
all proceedings without hiatus. 28 Surely defense counsel not only can but ethically must
bring forth any clemency information not
within the record of trial, and counsel can
always request a post-trial interview. Adverse
material may well be eliminated in this fashion, but shouldn't the convening authority's
action be taken on the record of trial in any
event? What then would be eliminated-only
the questionable ability of a member of the
SJA office to judge demeanor without the
:need of visiting the court-room, and the possibility of the accused raising a claim of inadequacy of counsel. Yet, civilian defendants denied the comfort of a post-trial interview and
seeking to challenge their attorney's representation do not appear hesitant to do so regardless of circumstances, and they do so without
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the added protections given by the Defense
Appellate Division.
In summary, the post-trial interview is of
questionable legality within its current procedural context, of little practical value to the
accused, a waste of vitally needed legal resources, and an unnecessary source of litigation. Staff judge advocates would do well to
abolish it before the Court of Military Appeals
does so.
Notes
1. See e.g. United States v. Lanzer, 3 M.J. 60 n. 6
(C.M.A. 1977) in which Chief Judge Fletcher stated: "As
should be evident from the body of this decision we
have doubts as to the vitality of post-trial interviews,
especially those in which the accused does not have
benefit of counsel. Our disposition of this case makes it
unnecessary to address this precise issue, and we will
reserve judgment until the proper case.'' The court
seems to have found the proper case in United States
v. Kelly, ,>osition for review granted, 3 M.J. 87 (C.M.A.
1977) in which the court agreed to determine whether a
post-trial interview held in the absence of counsel and
which yielded adverse material was a denial of due
process.

2. The day to day post-trial interview appears often to
be merely a ritualistic gesture more likely to yield
advance matter than important clemency material. It
may however provide a helpful defense to trial defense
counsel whose services are praised at the interview but
attacked later.
3. There are numerous cases in which the interview
yielded damaging material. See e.g. United States v.
Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending [at trial, Foer stated
that he wanted to "stay in the service," while at the
post-trial interview he stated that he did not want to
return to duty.]; United States v. Albert, 31 C.M.R. 326
(A.B.R. 1961) [accused confessed at the post-trial interview to an unrelated larceny which was then commented upon in the post-trial review].
4. In one sense, of course, the post-trial action of the
convening authority cannot hurt the accused because
the convening authority cannot approve a sentence
greater than that adjudged by the trial court. However
this view is to ignore reality as sentences are frequently
if not almost always modified by the convening authority or by the Courts of Review. Thus, it can be presumed
that there is usually a sentence which the accused
would have received, lesser in degree than the one
given by the court, but for consideration of adverse
material given at the post-trial interview.

5. See e.g. United States v. Clisson, 5 C.M.A. 277, 281, 17
C.M.R. 277, 281 (1954) [referring to Air Force regulations
requiring post-trial interviews]; United States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 602, 605-06 (A.B.R. 1953).
6. The Air Force has promulgated ~& model privacy act
statement for post-trial interviews and some Army
commands are using privacy act statements. See e.g.
Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 2, United States
v. Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending [Fort Carson].
7. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970). Many commands do in one
respect or another tell the accused that participation in
the post-trial interview is voluntary. Compliance with
Article 31(b)'s warning requirements is virtually unknown, however.
8. cf. Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 2, United
States v. Foer, supra note 6.
9. Assignment of El'l'Or and Brief on Behalf of Appellant
at 2, United States v. Minor, CM 434910, appeal pending.
In view of the fact that neither counsel nor judge may
comment on the silence of the accused at trial, affirmative reference in the post-trial review to the fact that
the accused remained silent on advice of counsel, as
was the case in Minor, would seem highly questionable
under both Article 31 and the fifth amendment. Certainly it presents a classic dilemma to the accused who is
afraid to participate for fear of revealing incriminating
materials.
10. See Goodrich, The Effect of a Guilty Plea on the
Right Against Self-Incrimination and Its Effect on Requested Testimony (Mar. 1977} (unpublished paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the diploma requirements of the 25th Advanced Class, The Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army) citing State v. Johnson, 77
Idaho 1, 287 P.2d 425 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007
(1956) [privilege intact until completion of appeals since
the pending appeal could result in a new trial]; People
v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947) [appellate process prevented infringement of the -privilege
until completion]; In re Bando, 20 F.R.D. 610 (D.C. N.Y.
1957), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Miranti,
253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1003
(1966) [conviction had been affirmed but defendant was
preparing to seek a writ of certiorari; held that mere
preparation of a writ is insufficient to continue the
privilege]. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 121 (2d
ed. 1972); cf. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231,
1233 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S.
309 (1974). Contra, Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203, 198 A.2d
285 (1964).
It is interesting to note the recent decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 21 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2195 (Pa. Apr. 28, 1977) in
which the court held that even post appeal collateral
relief may occasionally justify a defendant in exercising
his privilege and refusing to testify at trial. The trial
judge in such a case, said the court, must determine

DA Pam 27-50-55

16
whether the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger of self-incrimination." In Rogers, the court
was faced with the question of whether a defendant
was improperly denied his right to full cross examination when the witness, a convicted co-participant in a
robbery-murder, exercised his privilege to remain silent.
11. The court-martial is not yet identical with civilian
trials. Regardless of the merits of its present format
and procedure, the court-martial is still a creature of
command not yet fully divorced from its history. Despite
the important consequences of completion of the court
phase of a trial, both findings and sentence are virtually
advisory recommendations (recommendations, whether
as to findings or sentence, which can be completely
ignored by the convening authority so long as his
action is favorable to the accused) until acted upon by
the convening authority. Historically, courts-martial
were simply extensions of the commander, and even
today for purposes of finality, the trial is merely an
introduction to the commander's action. See e.g. United
States v. Occhi, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 93, 96, 54 C.M.R.
Adv. Sh. 93, 96 (1977) [Judge Cook stating that "The
Court recently held .•. [that] the legal effect of a courtmartial depends upon the action of the convening
authority rather than that of the trial court."]. But see
Judge Perry dissenting in part, 64 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. at 99.
12. 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1970): "No person subject to this
chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself
or to answer any questions the answer to which may
tend to incriminate him."
13. Under the precedents and analysis discussed in
note 10, supra, most general and some special· courtsmartial will not be final until after completion of the
automatic appeal to the Court of Military Review and
perhaps until the running of any time allowed for
further appeal to the Court of Military Appeals.
14. See United States v. Albert, 31 C.M.R. 326 (A.B.R.
1961); United States v. Powell, 26 C.M.R. 521 (A.B.R.
1958); United States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502 (A.B.R.
1953). See also United States v. Simpson, SPCM 11744
(A.C.M.R. 14 Apr. 1977).
15. United States v. Powell, 26 C.M.R. 521, 526 (A.B.R.
1958) [" ... we think that it would be preferable to give
such a [Article 31] warning routinely if only to avoid
any question of unfair treatment."]
16. United States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502, 506 (A.B.R.
1953).
17. United States v. Howard, 5 C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R.
186 (1954); but see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), ~ 140a(2), indicating
that the trial judge may warn a witness of his rights if
he begins to incriminate himself.
18. The Court's reasoning in United States v. Howard, 5
C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R. 186 (1964), was questionable when
it was decided and is long overdue for reappraisal. One

would think that a prosecutor might have an ethical
duty to warn a government witness of his rights. In
any event a trial judge, no longer a "mere referee," can
certainly be called upon to do s~ possibility apparently not considered by the 1954 Court. Further, if one is
to be concerned with considerations of "efficiency"
alone, the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL's discretionary warning requirement, see note 17, supra, a quasilegislative judgement, would seem to destroy the issue.
19. Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 3, United
States v. Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending, citing
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), a prison
disciplinary proceeding.
20. Respect for the principles behind Article 31 might
transmute the warning to indicate 'that statements
might be used against the accused in later proceedings
of this trial as well as other proceedings. In United
States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502, 507 (A.B.R. 1953), the
court restricted later use of evidence given during a
post-trial interview to proceedings involving the same
offenses for which he had been sentenced. While Article
31(b) normally requires that a suspect be warned of the
offenses of which he is suspected, there is authority to
dispense with that part of the warning when it is clear
that the accused knows the nature of the accusation,
United States v. Nitschke, 12 C.M.A. 489, 31 C.M.R. 75
(1961), and surely the post-trial interviewee knows the
nature of the offenses involved.
21. See note 14, supra.
22. 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as McOmber]. In McOmber, the court held that a
suspect or accused known to be represented by counsel
cannot be interrogated pre-trial unless counsel is notified of the interrogation and given a reasonable oppor- ·
tunity to be present.
23. However, the court found the error to be nonprejudicial.
24. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970). It is important to note the
emphasis that the Court of Military Appeals has placed
on continuing representation of the accused "post-trial"
and during the appellate process. United States v.
Palenius, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222, 229-31, 54 C.M.R.
Adv. Sh. 649, 556-59 (1977). Counsel may have an ethical
duty to attend post-trial interviews as well as a legal
right to do so.
25. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
26. The statutory basis of McOmber is questionable at
best. Compare McOmber with United States v. Clark, 22
C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1974). However, the case is
now a major precedent and its reasoning would appear
to apply at least in part to "post-trial" proceedings if
one accepts the proposition that modification of findings

,,-.
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and sentence are neither infrequent nor purely gratuitous in our system. In any event, United States v.
Palenius, 26 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222, 229-31, 64 C.M.R.
Adv. Sh. 649, 666--59 (1977), requiring that there be no
hiatus in representation, would appear determinative.

27. United States v. Goode, 23 C.M.A. 367, 60 C.M.R. 1
(1976).
28. United States v. Palenius, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222,
229-31, 64, C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 649, 656-59 (1977).

